Extrapolation and Prediction of User Behaviour from Wireless Home Automation Communication by Möllers, Frederik et al.
Short Paper: Extrapolation and Prediction of User
Behaviour from Wireless Home Automation
Communication
Frederik Möllers∗, Sebastian Seitz, Andreas Hellmann† and Christoph Sorge∗
∗Saarland University
∗ {frederik.moellers|christoph.sorge}@uni-saarland.de, † kontakt@anhellmann.de
ABSTRACT
Wireless home automation systems are becoming increas-
ingly popular. They can help users save energy and increase
the comfort. However, this increased convenience also comes
with new attack vectors. Many available systems provide lit-
tle to no security. In this paper, we explore the possibilities
of passive attacks against these systems. We exemplarily
investigate two real-world installations of off-the-shelf home
automation systems to see what amount of information can
be obtained by a passive adversary.
Our results show that the systems provide no privacy.
They leak information about the users’ habits as well as
their presence and can be abused to plan burglaries. Fur-
thermore, we conclude that even encrypted communication
does not fully protect against the attack presented here. In
particular, it is still possible to predict user presence and
absence even if individual actions cannot be identified.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
K.6.5 [Management of Computing and Information
Systems]: Security and Protection—Unauthorized access
Keywords
Privacy; Home Automation; Traffic Analysis; Wireless Net-
works; Profile Building
1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, home automation systems (HASs) have
become affordable and thus very popular with private users
[15]. While providing increased comfort, this also introduces
new attack vectors, especially with the increasingly popular
wireless systems [8]. Therefore it is necessary to consider the
security regarding attacks against both the functionality of
the system and the privacy of the inhabitants.
In this paper we present our security analysis of real-world
HASs, using HomeMatic installations as an example. We fo-
cus on passive attacks targeting the system’s communication
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to create user profiles and predict user behaviour. Our pas-
sive attack consists of 3 consecutive stages. First, data is
collected by sniffing the wireless communication. Semantic
information is extracted from this data, such as sensor read-
ings or actuator commands. As a second step, the attacker
identifies patterns in the data, either from automation rules
or from routine user behaviour. In the third step, the at-
tacker then predicts the user’s habits.
We also examine how much information can be obtained
by performing traffic analysis, where the adversary uses tim-
ing patterns and metadata to draw conclusions about the
users of the system. The information from both kinds of
attacks can be used, for example, to plan a burglary when
nobody is at home.
In addition to the burglary itself, insurance companies
might refuse to pay the damage, given that the informa-
tion was readily available from the inhabitants’ own system.
Thus, unsecured HASs can also be a monetary danger.
We conducted our analysis on two real-world installations
of the HomeMatic HAS. To make the scenario realistic, we
did not have any additional information about the two in-
stallations prior to the attack other than the fact that they
were HomeMatic HASs. In the case of the second system,
we were informed that it consisted of two parts that were
installed in different locations and connected via a VPN.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. First
we will provide some background information on the topic
and have a look at related work in this area. Then we explain
the methods we used in our analysis in Sect. 3 and present
our analysis in along with its results in Sect. 4. We conclude
with Sect. 5 and provide an outlook into future work.
2. BACKGROUND
For more than a decade now, technologies exist that en-
able the implementation of HASs. The type of devices in
a home automation (HA) network varies from simple power
switches and temperature sensors to smoke detectors and
door locks. Main benefits are efficiency and comfort, but
HASs can also be used or extended for security purposes.
Light-controlling movement detectors can detect burglars,
too, and supplementary intrusion detectors can use the ex-
isting network architecture to call the police.
2.1 Fundamentals of Home Automation Sys-
tems
Local communication technologies for HASs can be coarse-
ly divided into wired (e.g. BACnet) and wireless (e.g. Bid-
Cos). There are also standards that cover both (e.g. KNX).
A major difference between wired and wireless HASs is the
installation effort which disqualifies the former from instal-
lation in certain (especially rented) properties. However,
traffic from a wireless system can be intercepted and pos-
sibly manipulated from anywhere nearby. Thus, protection
against network attacks becomes much more important.
The topic of HA is closely related to that of building au-
tomation. Since building automation systems are usually
wire-based and used in public buildings, they do not focus
on privacy protection and have not been analyzed by us.
Currently, there are several HASs available on the mar-
ket, e.g. HomeMatic, EnOcean and Siemens Synco Living.
Our choice fell on the HomeMatic system. Due to its wide
availability, the potential number of volunteers was large.
In addition to this, hardware and open-source software ex-
ists that allows the capture of the communication and thus
could be used for our experiments.
2.2 Legal Considerations
Gathering data for our analysis turned out to be prob-
lematic: only two volunteers gave us permission to analyze
the traffic of their wireless HASs. A number of researchers
have performed “War Driving” experiments, which essen-
tially means getting information about a large number of
WiFi networks without having asked for permission. There
is, however, a legal difference to HASs—at least in Germany,
where our research has been conducted. A WiFi network’s
beacon frames are generally broadcast messages, directed
at anyone in the vicinity, to allow distinction between dif-
ferent networks. Data collected during War Driving might
(partly) be considered as personal data, which is protected
under European and national law. However, research pur-
poses can justify the collection and processing of data under
certain circumstances.
The messages exchanged by a wireless HAS, on the other
hand, are only meant to be received within that system.
From the perspective of legislation, the same limitations ap-
ply as in case of WiFi networks. In addition, collecting data
from non-public transmissions is also a criminal offense ac-
cording to section 202b of the German criminal code. We
therefore decided against this option.
2.3 Related Work
There has been extensive research in the area of home
automation in the last decade but very few have taken the
aspect of secure communication into account.
Al-Muhtadi et al. proposed a very early approach [1] based
on Jini and Tiny SESAME, a stripped down version of SE-
SAME, which itself is an extension to Kerberos. Their main
goals are authentication and access control and they do not
consider passive attacks.
Bergstrom et al. presented an approach to secure home
automation communications in 2001[2]. They assumed HA
networks being controlled via the Internet using a so-called
Global Home Server (GHS). The approach only focuses on
securing the communication between the GHS and the in-
dividual networks, whereas the local communication is not
taken into account.
Marin et al. [11] developed a middleware for home au-
tomation systems which relies on TLS for inter-node com-
munication. They introduce different authentication proce-
dures and encryption to secure data transmissions, but do
not consider leakage of information through side channels.
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have similar contraints
and requirements as HASs so research in this field can pro-
vide additional insight. Several surveys [9, 10, 14, 16] list
known problems and solutions. De Cristofaro [5] tackles the
problem of privacy protection for a user who queries a WSN.
While traffic analysis and other passive attacks are a well-
known threat in WSNs, the solutions rely on properties such
as multi-hop routing or a local attacker. HASs differ from
WSNs in exactly these aspects, so using WSN countermea-
sures in HASs requires extensive adaptations.
Concerns about traffic analysis in general go back as far
as 1981 [3]. Numerous approaches have been developed to
protect against this class of attacks [4, 6, 7, 13]. For com-
puter networks, they have proven to even throw back the
most powerful attackers [12]. However, similar to WSNs,
they leverage properties that do not exist in HASs, such as
routing and looser energy constraints.
3. ANALYSIS METHODS
For our passive attacks, we assumed a realistic attacker
model: The attacker can observe the whole system at once
over longer periods of time, but has no prior knowledge.
This was implemented by putting a capture device inside
the users’ homes without receiving any information about
the setup from the owners. While the position of the device
is certainly different in a real attack, we assume the same
coverage can be reached with multiple devices. The follow-
ing sections provide an overview of the methods used in our
analysis which have been implemented in a toolsuite. The
modules are called sniffer, cleaner and analyzer.
3.1 Data Acquisition
A simple and way to eavesdrop on the communication
is provided by the so-called CC1101 USB Lite (CUL) stick,
using an open-source firmware(called culfw) that can decode
several wireless HAS protocols. The collection of data is
performed by the sniffer module. It reads the data and
applies regular expressions which are used to preliminarily
identify the type and function of each node. They are found
in the FHEM (http://fhem.de) software. For our studies
we attached the stick to a Raspberry Pi which served as a
host computer and data storage.
3.2 Data Interpretation
The approach of applying regular expressions from the
FHEM software gave us a basic idea of the device categories
involved in the communication. In order to achieve max-
imum clarity about the packet contents, we processed the
collected transmissions in 4 steps.
1. The BidCos packet structure allows the distinction of
different devices based on their addresses. Counting
the number of distinct addresses in the collected pack-
ets also gives the number of devices in the network.
2. To clean the collected data, we discarded all packets
that were resent due to transmission errors. The re-
maining packets were saved in a database table whose
attributes (columns) correspond to the packet fields
(e.g. source address, length). The cleaner module
performs this task.
3. The classification of devices using regular expressions
is not error-free. FHEM relies on packets captured
from an initial pairing procedure, which the attacker
does not necessarily observe. In order to correct these
errors, we supplemented the preliminary classification
with plausibility checks. These checks are explained in
the next paragraph.
4. Lastly, we interpreted the messages according to their
context. Messages from a temperature sensor, for ex-
ample, were translated into decimal numbers. The
base station, when sending messages, assumed the be-
haviour of a different kind of device, e.g. it would
act as a remote control when sending commands to a
light switch. Choosing the method of interpretation
according to the destination let us correctly translate
this data as well.
Plausibility Checks
As mentioned in item 3 above, the mere layout of a certain
message may not clearly indicate whether it is a temperature
sensor status response or a command to a window opener.
To determine which of the two was correct, we would exam-
ine the possible interpretations of the data. A temperature
interpretation, for example, which results in a value out-
side the range from −25◦C to 50◦C would be unlikely to be
correct, since the systems were installed in German homes.
These checks can also be automated, but have only been
performed manually by us due to lower overall effort.
Another type of check is the inspection of communication
links. For example, a remote control is much more likely
to communicate with a window opener than with a tem-
perature sensor. Examining the communications partners
of a node thus helps to find plausible classifications. How-
ever, this would introduce dependencies and probabilities
into the identification process. Thus, these checks require
either manual intervention or complex logic and the gain of
additional information is questionable. As a result, we have
not implemented them and have used only minor manual
corrections to help in the classification.
3.3 Profile Building
After successfully identifying the device types, an attacker
can now build a profile of the inhabitants using the infor-
mation he gained from the above steps. We performed this
analysis in 3 different steps. All 3 steps are included in the
analyzer module.
3.3.1 Visualizing the Communication
As a first step, we displayed the collected data in formats
that allow a manual inspection. Two particular visualization
formats have proven to be useful for our analysis. On the one
hand we created a directed graph out of the collected device
data. Each device corresponds to a node and an edge is
created between each two devices that ever communicated
with each other. The width of the edge is determined by
the amount of messages on this link. On the other hand
we projected the messages to and from a single device in
relation to the time onto a 2-dimensional graph. This graph
type helps identify temporal structures and periodic events.
3.3.2 Correlation Analysis
In addition to the manual identification of correlated events,
we performed an automated correlation analysis using a slid-
ing window approach. We defined an event as a 4-tuple of
sender address, receiver address, message type and message
content. For each event e, we examined other events e∗ that
occured in a time frame after e. We then paired e with each
of these other events e∗ and for each pair (e, e∗) calculated
the number of occurences over the whole observation time.
3 parameters allow filtering out events: The minimum total
number of occurences of the event e, the minimum chance
of e being followed by e∗ and the length of the time frame
in which e∗ has to follow e in order to be counted.
3.3.3 Filtering Automation Rules
With a similar approach we tried to filter out programmed
automation rules. We assumed that automated events occur
at a fixed time which differs only marginally. For each event
we collected all occurences over the observation period. We
then stripped the date so only the time of day remained. As
a last step, we sorted the occurences in chronological order.
The sorted list allows for an easy identification of events that
often occured at similar times during a day.
4. RESULTS
The following sections present the analysis results.
4.1 Candidate 1 (C1)
The first installation is a simple single home installation.
We recorded 45,679 messages over a period of 36 days. Only
a few devices could not be identified with acceptable cer-
tainty. As we found out after a debriefing with the owner,
this was the case for the smoke detectors that only send
heartbeat messages to the central unit as well as one of the
tri-state sensors that did not send any state changes during
the observation period.
4.1.1 Communication Overview
Fig. 1 provides a graphical overview of the communica-
tion. Expectedly, the central unit Z 1.1 communicates with
most sensors and actuators so it could be easily identified.
The graph also allows us to identify which components are
directly paired with each other and do not exclusively com-
municate over the central unit. This information might be
useful, for example for later active attacks against the sys-
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Figure 1: Directed communication graph for candi-
date 1. The abbreviations used for the device types
are explained in Tab. 1.
4.1.2 Manual Examination of Message Graphs
Fig. 2 shows the temperature status messages of two tem-
perature/humidity sensors T/L 1.1 and T/L 1.2. What
immediately leaps to the eye is the different ranges that the
values lie in. We thus concluded that T/L 1.1 is located





KF KeyMatic Remote Control
KS KeyMatic Lock
R Smoke Detector
S/D Switch / Dimmer
ST Heating Actuator / Thermostat
T/L Temperature / Humidity Sensor
Z Central Unit
Table 1: Abbreviations for the different devices.
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Figure 2: Temperature values of T/L 1.1 and T/L
1.2 over the course of 6 weeks (upper) and values of
T/L 1.2 over the course of 7 days (lower).
We confirmed this by comparing the recorded values with
weather reports from the area.
Values of the in-house sensor T/L 1.2 consistently lie in
the range between 20◦C and 25◦C. The not perfectly regular
rise and fall suggests that the heating is controlled manually
and indicates a user habit. Furthermore we deduced from
the low outside temperature and the slow temperature drop
inside that the room is seldomly ventilated by widely open-
ing the windows for at least 10 minutes.
The tri-state sensors1 can be coarsely divided into two
groups. The first group consists of only two sensors, 3S 1.2
and 3S 1.4. Both send only very few messages with usually
the same content. No conclusions could be drawn about
their role. The second group consists of the remaining tri-
state sensors whose traffic mainly consists of open and close
state announcements.
Examining the protocol data for 3S 1.3 and 3S 1.6 re-
veals that they frequently switch the state. The open state
is never held for more than 1.5 minutes and usually lies in
the order of seconds, suggesting that the sensors are placed
on doors rather than windows. The activity over longer
time spans shows gaps during the nights and early morn-
ings. Since tri-state sensors notify about state changes usu-
ally caused by user interaction, these gaps are good indi-
cators for the inhabitants’ sleep cycles. 3S 1.6 changes its
state to closed some time before the gaps, which supports
the assumption that it is installed on the front door. This is
a major discovery for an attacker, because he can now tell
1The family of tri-state sensors includes different devices:
Window sensors that distinguish between open, closed and
tilted and door sensors which only distinguish between open
and closed. Technically, they are the same kind of device.
when the first inhabitant leaves the flat/house in the morn-
ing. If there is only one inhabitant, this knowledge is already
enough to plan a burglary during the owner’s absence.
Similar to the tri-state sensors, the switches/dimmers can
be divided into two groups. S/D 1.2, S/D 1.6 and S/D
1.8 showed very little activity over the observation period.
S/D 1.3 and S/D 1.4 regularly alternate between on and
off states. The activities of S/D 1.4 (Fig. 3) revealed a
strong regularity in the afternoon between 16:302 and 17:00
when the actuactor is switched on and at 1:00 when it is
switched off again. Each day the former action is performed
1.5 minutes earlier than the day before. This is a very strong
indicator for an automation rule which compensates for the
sunset times. This assumption is supported by the fact that
the respective commands come directly from the base station
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Figure 3: Data sent to and from switches/dimmers
S/D 1.3 and S/D 1.4.
Considering S/D 1.3, we found regular activity on week-
days between 1:00 and 2:00 as well as between 8:30 and
9:30. The slight variations support the conclusion that this
indicates a user habit rather than an automation rule. The
payloads of the recorded packets revealed that on weekday
mornings, the base station would send timer commands to
the switch between 8:00 and 9:15. These commands would
turn the switch on for an hour after which it would turn it-
self off again. We attributed this behaviour to either a habit
of the user after waking up or to an alarm function actually
waking the user by e.g. turning on the lights.
Another regularity is the absence of activity of S/D 1.3
between 13:00 and 17:30. The fact that this coincides with
a lack of activity of S/D 1.7 (12:00 to 18:30) lead us to the
conclusion that the user is absent during this time of day.
4.1.3 Correlation Analysis
We started the correlation analysis by trying out possible
parameter values. Since we had no prior knowledge about
the systems, the only approach was to manually determine
suitable parameters.
The results of the correlation analysis largely support the
previous findings which could already be observed in the
graphical analysis. Additional conclusions about the system
and the user are elaborated here.
In 72.5% of all cases where sensor 3S 1.6 was turned on,
it would be turned off again within 10 seconds. A similar
behaviour was observed for sensor 3S 1.4, which was closed
within the 10-second interval in 58% of all cases. In ac-
cordance with our reasoning above, we concluded that the
sensors are installed on doors rather than windows.
When selectively analyzing the behaviour of 3S 1.3 and
3S 1.5, we found them to act very much alike. In most cases
the state open did not hold for longer than 90 seconds. In
the case of 3S 1.3, this was especially interesting when con-
sidering the timer commands sent to it by the base station
in the mornings. The commands would turn on the switch
2Times in this paper are expressed in the 24-hour notation.
for 300 seconds, but in 96% of these cases, the switch would
be manually turned off within the first 90 seconds after re-
ception. This supports our theory that the switch is part of
an alarm function.
4.1.4 Filtering Automated Events
In order to filter out automated events, we initially started
the analysis with very strict parameters: The minimum
number of occurences of an event were set to 120, the max-
imum overall deviation of events possibly originating from
the same automation rule was set to 60 seconds and the max-
imum deviation of two consecutive events from the same rule
was set to 30 seconds. The only event to match at first was
a command from the base station which turns off S/D 1.4
at precisely 1:00, confirming our assumptions. We then pro-
ceeded to loosen the parameters to search for other rules.
The command coming from the base station and turning on
S/D 1.4 in the afternoon between 16:25 and 17:10 came out
next. Although the maximum distance between the differ-
ent occurences is 38 minutes, we concluded that this event
indicates the presence of an automation rule. The distance
between two consecutive occurences is about 90 seconds and
each event occured later than the one on the day before.
Rather than a user habit, we attributed this regularity to
an automation rule that incorporates sunset times.
4.2 Candidate 2 (C2)
The installation of C2 was somewhat special since it was
split up in two parts that are interconnected via a VPN.
One part was the user’s private flat and the other part was
his office. For this reason, we performed the data collection
in two parts. We first installed the sniffer at the office, then
moved it to the user’s home. During this period we recorded
34,707 messages sent from 20 devices.
4.2.1 Communication Overview
Fig. 4 shows the communication graph for candidate 2. It
can easily be seen that there is no single center of commu-
nication as opposed to the system of C1. Many devices are
paired directly with each other and only 6 of 19 available
sensors communicate with Z 2.1. Furthermore, neither the
remote control F 2.1 nor any of the three switches paired
with it communicate with Z 2.1. Thus, we can almost cer-
tainly rule out any automation rules for these devices, which
gives us more insight into the habits of the inhabitants. Nev-
ertheless, the segmentation of this installation and the VPN
connection between the segments make it quite difficult to
derive information about the physical presence of the in-
habitants from the automated events alone. The keymatic
remote controls KF 2.1 and KF 2.2 are paired with many
actuators in addition to the keymatic door locks and both
keymativ remote controls are paired with both door locks.
4.2.2 Manual Examination of Message Graphs
The temperature values given by the sensors T/L 2.1 – 2.3
and corresponding actuators ST 2.1 – 2.3 are strong indica-
tors for an automated heating concept. Over the weekends,
the temperatures drop gradually and then rise again sharply
at the start of the week. The different temperature and hu-
midity curves and the temperature differences of up to 10◦C
between the sensors lead us to the assumption that they are
installed in 2-3 different rooms.
When examining the activity of the remote control F 2.1
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Figure 4: Directed communication graph for C2.
The abbreviations are again those from Tab. 1
we found events only in the first part of the observation pe-
riod. This means that the user only uses the remote control
within the office itself and does not control any devices at
home. The observed activity is thus a very reliable indicator
of when the user is definitely present at the office and thus,
not at home.
Keymatic Door Lock System
The most interesting data for Candidate 2 came from the
automatic door lock system. Every day at about 9:15 as
well as between 20:00 and 22:00 the door locks report their
status to the central unit Z 2.1. We observed that there are
always two messages shortly after one another, first 3S 2.1
sends the state open and after a maximum of 60 seconds
the state close. Correlating the states of 3S 2.1 and KS
2.2, we concluded that 3S 2.1 is installed on the same door
as KS 2.2. Due to this combination, the presence of the
inhabitants can be easily predicted. Usually there is nobody
at home between 9:30 and 20:30, except for mondays, where
the time of absence lies between 13:00 and 21:00.
4.2.3 Correlation Analysis
Our correlation analysis found strong colleations between
the thermostats and the heating actuators as well as be-
tween the remote control F 2.1 and the actuators S/D 2.1,
S/D 2.5 and S/D 2.6. The thermostats show a consecutive
acknowledgement of the heating actuators new position in
98.8% of all cases. The switch and dimmmer actuators even
send their status as a reaction to a previous command from
the remote control in 100% of all cases.
We see similar clear results for the reactions of the Key-
matic door lock systems and the switches/dimmers S/D 2.2,
S/D 2.3 and S/D 2.4 to the Keymatic remote controls KF
2.1 and KF 2.2, where we recorded a reaction in 90% of
all cases. In addition to what we already knew, the correla-
tion analysis revealed that the tri-state sensor 3S 2.1 seems
to have a relation to KS 2.2, since over 60% of all status
changes of KS 2.2 result in a status change of 3S 2.1.
4.2.4 Filtering Automated Events
To filter automated events we used the same approach as
for the first candidate. We generally found the results to
support our findings from the manual analysis.
Using the automatic filtering method we could confirm our
assumption that the unlocking command sent from the base
station Z 2.1 to KS 2.2 at 8:30 in the morning does belong
to an automation rule. The same holds for the command
that locks KS 2.2 again at 22:30.
Furthermore we found that the the heating actuators are
automatically turned off at night. They regularly receive a
Pos.: 0% command from the temperature/humidity sensors.
4.3 Confirmation of Results
After our experiments, we interviewed both candidates
and discussed our findings with them. We were able to con-
firm our conclusions about the locations and purposes of
the different devices. The candidates also confirmed our as-
sumptions about automation rules and user habits.
4.4 Encrypted Communication
Applying encryption to all traffic in the HAS would make
the aforementioned attacks harder to some degree. Both our
approach to determine device types as well as our definition
of an event for the correlation analysis and automation rule
filtering incorporated the message payloads. They could not
be applied in the same way if these payloads were encrypted.
However, encryption alone would not prevent an attacker
from learning some information about the user. If the pack-
et’s source and destination address are unencrypted, an at-
tacker can still try to identify devices by using heuristics. For
example, devices that, from time to time, send two messages
in short succession are usually door state sensors. Devices
that only send one message each day can be assumed to be
smoke detectors and devices that receive one message each
morning and another one each evening can be assumed to be
door locks. The devices that communicate the most are base
stations, followed by temperature and humidity sensors.
Even if the complete packet, including the full header, is
encrypted, some information leaks to an eavesdropping ad-
versary. Activity in C1’s HAS between 12:00 and 18:00 was
8.6% higher on weekends and holidays than it was on work-
ing days. HAS activity in C2’s office was 21.3% lower during
these times, strongly indicating presence and absence.
5. CONCLUSIONS
We have analyzed of two installations of the HomeMatic
system and we have shown that this kind of system poses
a significant threat to the privacy of the users. In general,
systems that do not apply any kind of encryption leak a
large amount of information to any observer keen enough to
look for it. No prior knowledge about the installation or the
victim is necessary to perform this kind of attack.
Furthermore we have gained knowledge about the traits
of a HAS, such as possible communication links and how fre-
quently a device usually sends messages. This information
can be used to attack systems which apply encryption and
thus at the very least identify when users are at home. As
long as the systems do not provide a systematic protection
against traffic analysis attacks, they should be considered
vulnerable. To the best of our knowledge, no publicly avail-
able system provides this sort of protection as of now.
While we performed many tasks and checks manually dur-
ing our experiments, most of them can be automated with
the knowledge from our findings. Our parameters for finding
automated events proved useful, as long as the automation
rules did not change times themselves. Possible communi-
cation links, the usual frequencies with which the different
devices send status messages and the number of messages
being exchanged for each action of one device can be used
to program heuristics which can then in turn identify devices
in a system where packet payloads are encrypted.
5.1 Future Work
Considering how easy it is to attack current HASs, it is
essential to protect against the attacks mentioned in this
paper. While encryption schemes are available and can be
readily applied, protection against traffic analysis attacks in
HA networks is yet to be developed. Generating dummy
traffic in an effective and efficient manner can help tackle
this problem. Focus here can be put on the fact that the
energy consumption of sensors and actuators has to stay as
low as possible, but the base station is usually connected
to a power line and can thus send dummy traffic without
considerably decreasing battery lifetimes.
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